Curtailing Investor Protection under the Securities Laws: Good for the Economy by Steinberg, Marc I.
SMU Law Review
Volume 55 | Issue 1 Article 18
2002
Curtailing Investor Protection under the Securities
Laws: Good for the Economy
Marc I. Steinberg
Southern Methodist University, Dedman School of Law, msteinbe@mail.smu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Marc I. Steinberg, Curtailing Investor Protection under the Securities Laws: Good for the Economy, 55 SMU L. Rev. 347 (2002)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol55/iss1/18
CURTAILING INVESTOR PROTECTION
UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS: GOOD
FOR THE ECONOMY?
Marc I. Steinberg*
J am delighted to participate in this Law Review Symposium in honor
of Professor Joseph W. McKnight. The accomplishments of Professor
McKnight's brilliant career are universally admired. As his colleague
I am a beneficiary of Joe's good humor, insight, and common sense. This
Symposium is a fitting tribute to a gentleman who contributes so very
much to the vitality and decency of this superb law school.
Today the U.S. securities markets are one of this country's great
treasures.1 Other nations justifiably seek to implement the liquidity,
transparency, integrity, and investor protection qualities that embody our
securities markets. 2 Relatively efficient trading markets are based on a
disclosure regime where transactions are expeditiously executed and
competitively priced. Supported by competent self-regulation oversight
as well as government regulation, the U.S. securities markets are preemi-
nent.3 Nonetheless, difficulties have been experienced ranging from per-
petration of fraudulent practices 4 to episodic market failures5 to self-
* Rupert and Lillian Radford Professor of Law and Senior Associate Dean for Aca-
demics, Dedman School of Law, Southern Methodist University. Copyright 2002 by Marc
I. Steinberg. All Rights Reserved. My thanks to the Law School's Faculty Excellence
Endowment for my 2001 Summer Research Grant and to Mr. Brooks Leavitt for his re-
search assistance.
1. See David L. Ratner, The SEC at Sixty: A Reply to Professor Macey, 16 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1765, 1779 (1995).
2. See MARC I. STEINBERG, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES LAw-A CONTEMPORARY
AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (1999).
3. See Ratner, supra note 1, at 1779 (asserting that "the U.S. securities markets are
the best markets in the world"). See generally Marianne K. Smythe, Government Super-
vised Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry and the Antitrust Laws: Suggestions for an
Accommodation, 62 N.C. L. REV. 475 (1984).
4. See, e.g., United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997); United States v. Russo, 74
F.3d 1383 (2d Cir. 1996); Blinder, Robinson & Co. v. SEC, 837 F.2d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
Cf Howard Fineman & Michael Isikoff, Lights Out: Enron's Failed Power Play, NEWS-
WEEK, Jan. 21, 2002, at 14.
5. For example, on October 19, 1987, labeled as Black Monday, the Dow Jones In-
dustrial Average plunged 508 points, causing $500 billion of paper losses. The market trad-
ing issues, included those relating to price volatility, liquidity services, exchange specialist
performance, order execution, and clearance and settlement, are addressed in The October
1987 Market Break, A Report By the SEC's Division of Market Regulation (1988). See
also C. Edward Fletcher, Of Crashes, Corrections, and the Culture of Financial Informa-
tion-What They Tell Us About the Need for Federal Securities Regulation, 54 Mo. L. REV.
515 (1989); Roberta S. Karmel, Securities Industry Self-Regulation-Tested by the Crash, 45
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regulatory organization ("SRO") neglect.6
In its efforts to enhance capital raising and entry into the U.S. securi-
ties markets, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") has
made widespread accommodations for both domestic and foreign issuers.
These actions, for example, include: the adoption of the "accredited pur-
chaser ' 7 principle under Regulation D,8 thereby dismantling the
mandatory disclosure framework in offerings made solely to accredited
purchasers 9 and relegating such investors to private redress under federal
law exclusively to the Section 10(b)' ° anti-fraud remedy;"' shortening the
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1297 (1989); Janet E. Kerr & John C. Maguire, Program Trading - A
Critical Analysis, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 991 (1988); Jerry W. Markham & Rita McCloy
Stephanz, The Stock Market Crash of 1987-The United States Looks at New Recommen-
dations, 76 GEo. L.J. 1993 (1988); Lewis D. Solomon & Howard B. Dicker, The Crash of
1987: A Legal and Public Policy Analysis, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 191 (1988). With respect
to the SEC's and the market's responses to September l1th, see, e.g., Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 44791, [2001 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,530 (2001);
Gloomy Return: U.S. Stocks Plummet as Trading Resumes Without Major Hitches, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 18, 2001, at Al.
6. See, e.g., In re Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., [1995-1996 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 85,825 (Dec. 20, 1996); See also MARC I. STEINBERG & RALPH C.
FERRARA, SECURITIES PRACTICE: FEDERAL AND STATE ENFORCEMENT § 13:01 (2d ed.
2001):
In 1996, the SEC brought an administrative enforcement action against the
NASD, and censured the SRO for allegedly failing to enforce compliance
with the Exchange Act as well as its own rules. Simultaneously, the Commis-
sion issued a Section 21(a) Report of Investigation. In settling the enforce-
ment action, without admitting or denying the SEC's findings, the NASD
undertook to spend a total of $100 million during the next five years to en-
hance the SRO's enforcement, surveillance, and examination oversight
functions....
7. See Rule 501(a) of Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2001). See generally
Marc I. Steinberg, The "Accredited" Individual Purchaser Under SEC Regulation D: Time
to Up the Ante, 29 SEC. REG. L.J. 93 (2001).
8. Securities Act Release Nos. 6389, 24 SEC Docket (CCH) 1166 (Mar. 8, 1982);
Securities Act Release No. 6759, 40 SEC Docket (CCH) 449 (Mar. 3, 1988); Securities Act
Release No. 6825, 43 SEC Docket (CCH) 704 (Mar. 14, 1989). See generally J.W. HICKS,
LIMITED OFFERING EXEMPTIONS: REGULATION D (2000).
9. See Manning G. Warren, Ii, Review of Regulation D: The Present Exemption Regi-
men for Limited Offerings Under the Securities Act of 1933, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 355, 382
(1984):
[T]he [Regulation D] reforms adopted by the SEC... may overestimate the
abilities of the presumably wealthy. It is important to note that the catego-
ries of "wealthy" investors frequently include the widows and orphans whose
protection traditionally has been the sacred trust of the SEC. Experience
indicates that the wealthy often do not have the sophistication to demand
access to material information or otherwise to evaluate the merits and risks
of a prospective investment. Consequently, they frequently fail to seek pro-
fessional advice....
10. 15 U.S.C § 78j(b) (1997).
11. Note that the Supreme Court's decision in Gustafson v. Alloyd & Co., 513 U.S. 561
(1995), forecloses invocation of Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act to private offerings.
See infra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
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holding period to resell restricted securities 12 to one year 13 and permit-
ting unrestricted resales by nonaffiliates 14 of the subject issuer after a
two-year holding period;15 authorizing extensive incorporation by refer-
ence1 6 in registered offerings by less than premier issuers 17 pursuant to
the shelf registration rule' 8 and SEC Form S-3;19 promulgating Regula-
tion S 2 0 and Rule 144A,21 thereby facilitating "offshore" offerings of se-
curities2 2 without implicating the Securities Act's registration mandates
and the subsequent resale of such securities in the United States in a mar-
ket comprised solely of "Qualified Institutional Buyers";23 and the relax-
ation of disclosure requirements for foreign companies.2 4
12. The term "restricted securities" is defined in SEC Rule 144(a)(3), 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.144(a)(3) (2001). Generally, the term encompasses "securities acquired directly or
indirectly from the issuer, or from an affiliate of the issuer in a transaction or chain of
transactions not involving any public offering." Adoption of Rule 144, Securities Act Re-
lease No. 5223 [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep (CCH) 1 78,487 at 81,049
(Jan. 11, 1972).
13. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d) (2001); Securities Act Release No. 7390, 63 SEC
Docket (CCH) 2077 (Feb. 20, 1997).
14. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(a)(1) (2001) (defining an "affiliate" of an issuer as "a per-
son that directly, or indirectly through one or more intermediaries, controls, or is con-
trolled by, or is under common control with, such issuer").
15. See 17 C.F.R. §230.144(k) (2001); Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7390, 63
SEC Docket (CCH) 2077 (Feb. 20, 1997). See generally, MARC I. STEINBERG, UNDER-
STANDING SECURITIES LAW 136-44 (3d ed. 2001).
16. Securities Act Release No. 6231, 20 SEC Docket (CCH) 1059 (Sept. 2, 1980); Se-
curities Act Release No. 6331, 23 SEC Docket (CCH) 288 (Aug. 18, 1981); Securities Act
Release No. 6383, 24 SEC Docket (CCH) 1262 (Mar. 3, 1982); Securities Act Release No.
6964, 52 SEC Docket (CCH) 2015 (Oct. 22, 1992).
17. See MARC I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION 292 (3d ed. 1998):
[I]n 1992 the Commission lowered the requirements for use of Form S-3.
First, an issuer generally must have an Exchange Act reporting history of
twelve months rather than the former thirty-six months. Second, with respect
to issuer primary offerings of common stock, once in the reporting system for
twelve months, an issuer would qualify for Form S-3 by having a public float
prior to such offering of at least $75 million (representing the aggregate mar-
ket value of the company's voting stock held by non-affiliates). The former
three million share annual trading volume test has been eliminated. This rule
change enabled approximately 450 additional issuers to qualify for Form S-
3. ...
Id. (citing, Securities Act Release No. 6964, 52 SEC Docket (CCH) 2015 (Oct. 22, 1992)).
18. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.415 (2001); Securities Act Release No. 6499. 29 SEC Docket
(CCH) 138 (Nov. 17, 1983). See generally Barbara Ann Banoff, Regulatory Subsidies, Effi-
cient Markets, and Shelf Registration: An Analysis of Rule 415, 70 VA. L. REV. 135 (1984).
19. Securities Act Release No. 6383, 24 SEC Docket (CCH) 1262 (Mar. 3, 1982).
20. Securities Act Release No. 6863, 46 SEC Docket (CCH) 52 (Apr. 24, 1990). The
SEC amended Regulations S in 1998. See Securities Act Release No. 7505, [1997-1998
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,006 (SEC 1998).
21. Securities Act Release No. 6862, 26 SEC Docket (CCH) 26 (Apr. 23, 1990). See
Marc I. Steinberg & Daryl L. Lansdale, Regulation S and Rule 144A: Creating a Workable
Fiction in an Expanding Global Securities Marketplace, 29 INT'L LAW. 43 (1995).
22. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(i) (2001). See generally Samuel Wolff, Offshore Distribu-
tions under the Securities Act of 1933: An Analysis of Regulation S, 23 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
BUS. 101 (1991-1992).
23. The definition of "qualified institutional buyer" is set forth in Rule 144A(a). 17
C.F.R. § 230.144A(a) (2001).
24. See, e.g., Securities Act Release Nos. 6437, 26 SEC Docket (CCH) 964 (Nov. 19,
1982); Securities act Release No. 7053, 56 SEC Docket (CCH) 1256 (Apr. 19, 1994). See
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Along similar lines, the U.S. Congress has enacted legislation seeking
to foster capital formation and relieve publicly-held enterprises from the
travails of frivolous litigation (also known as "strike SUitS").25 Indeed,
from 1995 to 1998, Congress passed three major Acts2 6 that: preempt
state securities regulation in significant respects;27 facilitate corporate dis-
closure of forward-looking information 28 by setting forth safe harbors
from private liability;29 render plaintiff's task of establishing liability
more onerous; 30 and implement purported reforms that impede private
litigants from pursuing class actions.31
The federal courts, most particularly the Supreme Court, have also
been influential during the past twenty-five years in restricting investor
access to redress with perhaps the concomitant effect of encouraging cap-
ital formation.32 Examples include confining Section 10(b) to deception
or manipulation (thereby foreclosing that statute from reaching breaches
of fiduciary duty);33 restricting the Section 10(b) statute of limitations to
generally, STEINBERG, supra note 2, at 34-38; Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a
Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate Whom?, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2498 (1997); Bevis
Longstreth, A Look at the SEC's Adaptation to Global Market Pressures, 33 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 319 (1995).
25. A strike suit may be defined as "[a] lawsuit of questionable merit initiated largely,
if not solely, for its nuisance value and which seeks to induce the named defendants to
settle the action." STEINBERG, supra note 15, at 407.
26. The three Acts are: The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA"),
Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995); National Securities Markets Improvement Act
("NSMIA"), Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (1996); and the Securities Litigation Uni-
form Standards Act ("SLUSA"), Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998).
27. For example, NSMIA preempts state regulation of Rule 506 Regulation D offer-
ings and SLUSA, with certain exceptions, preempts state law in securities class actions
involving nationally traded securities. See, e.g., Robert G. Bagnell & Kimble Cannon, The
National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996: Summary and Discussion, 25 SEC.
REG. L.J. 3 (1997); Richard W. Painter, Responding to a False Alarm: Federal Preemption
of State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1998).
28. Forward-looking statements generally refer "to 'soft' future-oriented information
rather than historical 'hard' information, encompassing projections of future performance
and appraisals of specified assets." STEINBERG, supra note 15, at 394.
29. See Exchange Securities Act § 27A, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2 (1997); Section 21E of the
Securities Exchange Act § 21E, 15 U.S.C. § 77u (1997). For case law construing the param-
eters of the PSLRA safe harbor, see, e.g., Harris v. Ivax Corp., 182 F.3d 799 (11th Cir.
1999).
30. Another example is the enhanced pleading fraud with particularity requirements
codified in the PSLRA. See Securities Exchange Act § 21D(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77u (1997).
For case law interpreting Section 21D(b), see, e.g., Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300 (2d Cir.
2000); In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999); Williams v. WMX
Techs., 112 F.3d 175 (5th Cir. 1997).
31. See Securities Exchange Act § 27(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1 (1997); Securities Exchange
Act § 21D(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77u (1997). These provisions seek to curb the "professional
plaintiff" problem and other perceived abuses in private securities class actions. See gener-
ally Symposium on the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 Bus. LAW. 975(1996); Symposium, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 831 (1996); Symposium, 24 SEC. REG. L.J. 115
(1996).
32. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (adopting pur-
chaser-seller standing requirement under § 10(b) due in part to the "threat of extensive
discovery and disruption of normal business activities which may accompany a lawsuit
which is groundless in any event, but cannot be proved so before trial .... "). See also,
Wharf (Holdings) Ltd. v. United Int'l Holdings, Inc., 532 U.S. 588 (2001).
33. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
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that of a one-year/three-year period;34 requiring that scienter35 be proven
in Section 10(b) actions;36 narrowing the scope of insider trading liabil-
ity;37 eliminating aider and abetter liability in private actions; 38 limiting
the coverage of Securities Act Section 12(a)(2) 39 to public offerings; 40
and upholding the validity of pre-dispute brokerage arbitration agree-
ments mandating that broker-dealer customers forego their right to seek
judicial redress and be relegated to the arbitral forum.41
This tripartite action-the Congress, Supreme Court and the SEC-
has greatly altered the landscape of investor protection in this country.
Today, aggrieved investors frequently are compelled to resort to a diffi-
cult-to-prove antifraud provision42 accompanied by onerous pleading re-
quirements 43 with state law remedies largely preempted. 44 Customers of
brokerage firms similarly find themselves in an unenviable position.
Rather than pursuing their claims in state court before a jury, such inves-
tors now are compelled ordinarily to try their cases before three arbitra-
tors, one of whom is an industry representative. 45 No written opinion or
reasoning underlying a decision is normally required 46 and prospects for
overturning an arbitral decision are dim.47 Not surprisingly, although
34. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Pettigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991) (re-
quiring that suit be brought under § 10(b) within one year after the violation was (or per-
haps should have been) discovered by the complainant and in no event greater than three
years after the violation).
35. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12, 197 (1976) (defining "sci-
enter" as "a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud" that may be
proven by "knowing or intentional misconduct").
36. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980); Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. 185.
37. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222 (1980). See also, United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). See generally WIL-
LIAM K. S. WANG & MARC 1. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING (1996 & 2002 supp.).
38. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994). In
enacting the PSLRA, Congress provided the SEC with authority to pursue aiders and abet-
tors for alleged violations of the Securities Exchange Act. See Securities Exchange Act
§ 20(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(f) (1997).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 77(a)(2) (1997).
40. Gustafson v. Alloyd & Co., 513 U.S. 561 (1995). See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Se-
curities Act Section 12(2) After the Gustafson Debacle, 50 Bus. LAW. 1231 (1995); Ted J.
Fiflis, Gustafson v. Alloyd & Company., Inc.: Judicial vs. Legislative Power, 23 SEC. REG.
L.J. 423 (1996); Janet E. Kerr, Ralston Redux: Determining Which Section 3 Offerings Are
Public under Section 12(2) After Gustafson, 50 SMU L. REV. 175, 178-79 (1996).
41. Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc, 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Shearson/
Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
42. The elements of a Section 10(b) action are addressed in ALAN R. BROMBERG &
LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD § 2.3 (2000); MARC I.
STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION: LIABILITIES AND REMEDIES §§ 7.01-7.10 (2001).
43. See supra note 30 and cases cited therein.
44. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
45. See SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE OF ARBITRATION ("SICA"), UNIFORM
CODE OF ARBITRATION § 8(a)(2) (1999); NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEAL-
ERS INC. ("NASD"), CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE Rule 19(c)-(d) (1996). See gen-
erally MARILYN B. CANE & PATRICIA A. SHUB, SECURITIES ARBITRATION: LAW AND
PROCEDURE 37 (1991).
46. See e.g., NASD Rule 41, supra note 45.
47. Grounds for overturning an arbitration award, for example, include arbitrator mis-
conduct, bias, or manifest disregard of the law. See Federal Arbitration Act § 10, 9 U.S.C.
§ 10 (1994); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Jaros, 70 F.3d 418, 421 (6th Cir.
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meeting with some success, allegedly-aggrieved brokerage customers fre-
quently lose in securities arbitration.48
From a policy perspective, the foregoing limitations on investors' rights
are justified as necessary to facilitate capital formation, help remove un-
due burdens that impede business efficiency, and curtail frivolous strike
suit litigation fueled by plaintiffs' attorneys seeking lucrative contingency
fees. 49 Clearly, these objectives are laudable and their effectuation has
been promoted by actions taken by Congress, the courts, and the SEC.
But they are not without costs. Investor protection has been dimin-
ished.50
Examples of alleged unfairness abound: the widow having a tenth-
grade education who has four school-aged children and is barred from
court for failing to meet the Section 10(b) one-year inquiry notice period
for statute of limitations purposes;51 the unsophisticated investor, who re-
lies on his broker's oral representations that contradict the issuer's truth-
ful written offering documents, being precluded from bringing suit;52 and
the investor unable to procure discovery in a case purportedly "smelling
of fraud" because she is unable to meet the pleading fraud with particu-
larity requirements. 53 Similar examples arise with frequency.54 Whether
they occur in sufficient volume to undercut investor confidence in the
fairness of the U.S. securities markets (and the availability of adequate
avenues of redress) remains to be seen.
This diminution in investors' rights has been accompanied by the pres-
ence of an impressive bull market. 55 Investors seeking redress during
1995). Hence, challenging an arbitration award is usually fruitless and can be dangerous.
Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Securities Industry Arbitrations: An Examina-
tion and Analysis, 53 ALB. L. REV. 755, 864 (1989). See also, David A. Lipton, The Stan-
dard on Which Arbitrators Base Their Decisions, 16 SEC. REG. L.J. 3 (1988).
48. See William Glaberson, When the Investor Has a Gripe, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29,
1987, at C. 1, 8 (stating that "the brokerage houses basically like the current system be-
cause they own the stacked deck"). See also, NORMAN S. POSER, BROKER DEALER LAW
AND REGULATION §7.01[A] (3d ed. 1999); Cheryl Nichols, Arbitrator Selection at the
NASD: Investor Perception of a Pro-Securities Industry Bias, 5 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp.
RESOL. 63, 127-28 (1999); Marc I. Steinberg, Securities Arbitration: Better for Investors
Than the Courts?, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1503, 1504 (1996).
49. See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 739 (stating that "litigation under Rule 10b-5
presents a danger of vexatiousness different in degree or in kind from that which accompa-
nies litigation in general"); Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Joint Explanatory
Statement of the Committee of Conference, H.R. REP. No. 104-369 (1995) (legislation
needed "to reform abuses involving the use of 'professional plaintiffs' and the race to the
courthouse to file the complaint"); supra notes 8-48 and accompanying text.
50. See examples infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
51. Dodds v. Cigna Sec., Inc., 12 F.3d 346 (2d Cir. 1993).
52. Brown v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 991 F.2d 1020, 1033 (2d Cir. 1993).
53. Wexner v. First Manhattan Co., 902 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1990) (single investor
claiming losses due to alleged fraud amounting to several million dollars).
54. See e.g., Lampf, Pleva, 501 U.S. at 369-70 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (opining that
in applying the one year/three year § 10(b) statute of limitations, the Court "inflicts an
injustice on the respondents [and] [q]uite simply ... shuts the courthouse door on respon-
dents because they were unable to predict the future").
55. Many analysts date the bull market's birth to August 12, 1982. At that time, the
Dow Jones Industrial Average was below the 1000 level. See Greg Ip, Identity Crisis: Why
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such profitable times would seemingly be a relatively small percentage.
Nonetheless, even in the midst of these booming markets, penny stock 56
fraud emerged as the leading type of investor fraud in this country. 57
With the markets (particularly the NASDAQ) having plummeted during
the relatively recent past, 58 a greater number of investors likely are seek-
ing monetary recompense. 59 Although investing in securities is not an
insurance policy, 60 investors, believing that they have been deceived, will
seek to hold allegedly-culpable parties responsible. The extent to which
they receive their so-called "day in court" and the perceived fairness of
that process may portend whether the U.S. securities markets will con-
tinue to attract individual investor participation with the same fervor.
Individual investor participation in equity securities is one of the signif-
icant strengths of the U.S. markets. Although institutional holdings com-
prise a majority of investor participation,61 individual holdings play
significant roles in providing needed capital and liquidity to business en-
terprises and markets.62 Widespread recognition of the curtailment of in-
vestor redress for alleged securities fraud may induce individual investor
relocation of assets to other sources, such as mutual funds, certificates of
deposit, fixed annuities, real estate, and sports memorabilia. Such an
eventuality would likely impair the efficiency of the U.S. markets and
the Bull is Acting More Like a Bear, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2000, at C1. See also, Peter A.
McKay et al. , Late Surge Pulls Industrials Out of Bear's Jaws, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 2001,
at C1.
56. "Penny stocks are low priced, highly speculative securities generally sold in the
over-the counter-market (OTC) and generally not listed on an exchange." STEINBERG &
FERRARA, supra note 6, at § 2:17.20.
57. See Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-429, Title V, § 501, 104 Stat.
951 (1990); SEC Rule 15c2-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-6 (2001).
58. For example, in 2000, "the Nasdaq Composite Index plunged 39.3% to 2470.52, its
worst year since it was created in 1971. Similarly, the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell
6.2% to 10786.85 for the year, breaking a nine-year winning streak and representing its
worst calendar year since 1981. Likewise, the Standard & Poor's 500-stock index lost
10.1% to 1320.28," which was its worst year since 1977. See Greg Ip, Though Nasdaq Was
Massacred, Dow, S&P 500 Declines Missed Measuring Stick for Bear Market, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 2, 2001, at R1. For 2001, the Dow Jones Industrial Average closed the year at 10021.50
points. See Market Diary, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2002, at C1.
59. Indeed, NASD Dispute Resolution Inc., a subsidiary of the National Association
of Securities Dealers, reported that arbitration filings have increased 15% during the first
quarter of 2001. Additionally, according to the SEC, complaints about brokers' sales prac-
tices are growing. See Ruth Simon, Sales-Practice Complaints to SEC Increase: Some Bro-
kers Advised Buying Unsuitable Stocks, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 2001, at C1.
60. See Rifkin v. Crow, 574 F.2d 256, 262 (5th Cir. 1978) (stating that absent the re-
quirement of causation, Rule 10b-5 would become an insurance plan for the cost of every
security purchased in reliance upon a material misstatement or omission). See also Section
21D(b)(4) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77u (1997) (loss causation required
to be shown).
61. See Market 2000 Report: An Examination of Current Equity Developments, Divi-
sion of Market Regulation, Securities and Exchange Commission (1994) (stating that
"[t]he 'institutionalization' of the market has accelerated since the 1970s [and that] by
1992, [institutions] owned slightly over 50%").
62. Id. (stating that "individual investor participation in the markets is still
widespread").
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adversely impact the vitality of the U.S. economy. 63
This eventuality highlights the risk and irony of the tripartite action
taken by Congress, the courts, and the SEC. In seeking to enhance capi-
tal formation and alleviating the burdens placed on business by the threat
of vexatious litigation, the scales may be tipped disproportionately
against investor protection. If this is indeed the situation, access to capi-
tal will be impaired, particularly by smaller companies seeking to go pub-
lic. 64 Indeed, whether the recent decrease in initial public offerings65 can
be traced in part to investor perception of the dearth of adequate redress
raises a provocative question, the answer of which is unknown. Certainly,
the bear markets that recently existed were mainly due to other rea-
sons.66 Nonetheless, while investors in equity securities generally part
with their funds with profit as their dominant objective, many such inves-
tors will do so only if they feel secure that appropriate redress will be
procured if they are deceived. Vindication of legitimate investor griev-
ances is a core determinant for these investors. 67
Nonetheless, perhaps the proper balance indeed has been struck. The
previous statutory, judicial, and regulatory pronouncements that now
have been curtailed may have unduly impeded capital formation and fa-
vored strike suit plaintiffs and their lawyers. The passage of time with the
presence of the accompanying market and economic conditions likely will
reveal whether an appropriate accommodation has been reached.
The stakes in this process are high. Investor confidence and market
integrity are key components underlying the primacy of the U.S. securi-
ties markets. Widespread investor perception that these qualities have
been significantly diminished would be detrimental. Capital raising
would be impeded, the secondary trading markets in many securities
would experience reduced liquidity, and investor funds would flow to
other types of investments. Such an eventuality would likely have signifi-
63. See Lewis D. Solomon & Howard B. Dicker, The Crash of 1987. A Legal and
Public Policy Analysis, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 191,192-93 (1988). Cf. Gloomy Return: U.S.
Stocks Plummet as Trading Returns Without Major Hitches, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2001, at
Al; Markets Reopening Seen as Victory, Despite Dow's Tumble Through Week,, 33 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1359 (2001).
64. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC as a Bureaucracy: Public Choice,
Institutional Rhetoric, and the Process of Policy Formulation, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 527
(1990).
65. As of mid-March 2001, just 23 deals valued at $4.03 billion had come to market
during the first quarter of-2001. By contrast, the first quarter of 2000 saw 119 initial public
offerings raising $15.69 billion. See Raymond Hennessey, IPO Outlook: For IPO Market,
It Is a Quarter to Forget, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 2001, at C17; Kara Scannell, IPO Rocket
Lands as Investors Prefer Profits to Pipe Dreams, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2001, at R6.
66. The recent bear market may be attributed in part to slowing revenue growth and
declining earnings of Internet and technology companies. Additionally, recessionary con-
cerns, a weakening global economy, and increasing oil prices also have played a role. See
Gregory Zuckerman, A Year After the Peak: How Nasdaq's Mighty Have Fallen, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 5, 2001, at C1. See also, E.S. Browning & Gregory Zuckerman, Market's Mood:
Fast Stock Snapback? History Suggests You Shouldn't Be So Sure, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26,
2001, at Al.
67. See Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S.
426 (1964).
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cant adverse consequences for the U.S. economy. 68
On the other hand, if the proper balance has been struck, then the U.S.
securities markets (absent dismal economic conditions) should continue
to flourish, with widespread individual investor participation. Hopefully,
Congress and the SEC, as the "statutory guardians" of the investing pub-
lic, 69 will monitor this situation and seek to correct any undue imbalance
that should arise.
68. Cf Enron's Sins, WALL ST. J., Jan 18, 2002, at A10; Michael Schroeder, Enron
Debacle Saved Calls for Controls, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2001, at A4.
69. See SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020, 1027-28 (2d Cir. 1978).
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